American Politics and Diplomacy; Origins of the Cold War; and the Dewey-Truman Election of 1948, part 2

The fourth party in 1948, Strom Thurman's State's Rights Party, composed of dissident southern Democrats, was also a party which helped Mr. Truman. In its stand against civil rights, which was largely the orientation of Thurman's party, Thurman tended to suggest that Truman was honest in his civil rights position, and to solidify the role of blacks and ethnics and cities in support of Truman. And a good deal of the votes which Truman was to get in crucial Middle Western states probably is a reflection of this. So in terms of the four platforms, they tell us a good deal about the mood of the times. Now as for the candidates, the Republicans, as I suggested to begin with, had a choice of who would be their inevitable winner. In other words, they were choosing the next president in 1948. One of those who wanted to be the next president was Harold Stassen, young and eager. He was to be done in the primaries and not to emerge as a serious threat thereafter. Senator Vandenberg played a hesitant role, but he

clearly would have enjoyed a greater measure of leadership than simply as a member of the Senate. Vandenberg, however, didn't have a very strong national base, and he was not the kind of charismatic figure that some were seeking. The man whom the party regulars, the Republican party regulars, thought was unquestionably the best candidate they had or the best representative they had, was Senator Taft of Ohio. But Taft was simply not a good vote-getter in the eyes of the party. So they turned away from the man that they liked the most, towards the man that they thought would win. They not very widely popular within the party figure of Thomas Dewey of New York. He once defeated by Roosevelt, but you could forgive him that, because after all, no one could effectively mount opposition to Roosevelt. So after a good deal of pulling and hauling, the third ballot gave the nomination to Thomas Dewey in 48, and he ran with another

relatively liberal Republican Earl Juan of California. It was then a ticket which annoyed Republican regulars, because it did not represent either the conservative domestic policy of a part of the party nor an isolationist point of view. It seemed too liberal, it seemed too much a imitation, if you will, of parts of the Democratic Party. The choice for the Democrats, or what I should have mentioned, I will now, because it's a nice bridge between the two parties. Both parties would have been delighted to run Eisenhower in 1948. This was possible because no one knew what party he belonged to, if any, and therefore the Republicans as the Democrats tried to smoke out the party identification of general Eisenhower and hopefully put him on the ticket. And both of them, I think, quite rightly realized that if they could get him, he could win. It wouldn't have

mattered which party he was standing for. But Eisenhower did not play the game in 1948, and therefore the Republicans had to look elsewhere. The Democrats, looking at the midterm elections, looking at the polls for Truman, just looking generally at the president, thought that they would be in a very good shape if he could just disappear. This he refused to do. He would not roll over and play dead. Eisenhower would not declare himself a Democrat and run on the ticket. And therefore the Democrats assembled in 48, not in a mood to re-elect a president, but in almost a mood of a wake, a kind of national moment of grief, a grieving. The only person who was not grieving was Harry Truman, who, if we trust his own words, as reported after afterwards, had planned to run again all along and had had no hesitation that he was going to win. He thought he could make incumbency work for him. The Democratic convention was, as I say, dismal. One of the few rather extravagant moments

came when one of the pro-peace members of the Democratic convention released some doves from a liberty bell at a crucial moment in the convention, and the doves totally unaware of the importance of the occasion, not only swooped on the delegates, one nearly landed on Sam Rayburn's head, another one knocked himself out on the gallery and fell to the floor. It was typical of the Democratic Disorder of 48 that this should happen, and those that remained around did not reassure the delegates as to their personal security. It was a convention then, which ended with Truman getting the nomination because they could not turn down an incumbent. With Barkley as the vice presidential candidate, Barkley having given the only speech that brought the convention alive, and Truman announcing that he was going to call Congress back in session on Turnip Day, July 26th, and tried to make them pass some legislation. So the tone

of Truman's campaign was thus sad. The Dixie Cratt departure in the direction of an independent third-party status I've already indicated, and Wallace had previously left. This, by all the logic of political science, should have met a democratic defeat. The right wing and the left wing had been cropped off. The Democratic Center was disillusioned. The polls reflected that the president was way down in popularity, and thus the campaign started. It was a dull campaign. Mr. Dewey elected to say nothing, and he said it beautifully, and he said it often, because it's easy to forget how many speeches he made, but they all in retrospect seem to flow into one, because as he said in his own words, my job is to prevent anything from rocking the boat, and he was just sure if the boat was unrocked, he would win. He had a plan, a game which was not flexible, and he had no innovative capacity. So he almost rigidly marched his through, his game plan, in

1948, down to defeat. He could have refuted Truman's charges about the do-nothing Congress. He could very effectively have engaged Mr. Truman, because Truman was on, as I will say, in a moment, pretty weak grounds, but he never chose to do so. He felt that any conflict would harm him, and therefore he preferred to be bland and above the issues. He was managed by a good firm, Bath and Barton Durstine and Osborne, and his performances were very stylish. He regularly would wait until the all the preliminaries had taken place at a rally, and then you'd hear sirens off stage, and the candidate would appear as from nowhere with his arms out, ready to embrace the delegates, and after the hush before his appearance there would be wild applause, and this was the pattern of the Dewey campaign. It alienated local politicals for a good reason. They would have far preferred to have the candidate sitting there and showing a degree

of empathy. He seemed to detach himself from the local structure by coming in as it were from a cloud. And finally, Mr. Dewey, in a very unimportant episode, probably lost some crucial Middle-Western votes. In Illinois, at one point, the train moved a few feet towards the crowd. No one was hurt. No damage was done, but Mr. Dewey, a governor, do a loud himself to make the memorable remark. Well, that's the first lunatic I've had for an engineer. He probably should be shot at sunrise, but we'll let him off this time. It was an invitation that the Democrats could not resist to suggest that Dewey's attitude towards people made him susceptible to shooting people at sunrise. That beyond that he had a lack of interest in the working man as exemplified by that American folk hero, the railway engineer, that he just generally was insensitive to all the things that matter in this country, and they used it over and over again, and it

always got a good audience reaction. Beyond that, Mr. Dewey seemed to make certain mistakes in sensing the crowd one day. He congratulated himself in having come to a particular town, and therefore he said, I see so many children in the crowd. You must be glad that you have a day off from school and a voice shouted, this is Saturday. At another time, he saw something red go by and he said, I think we've had enough flowers and someone said that was a tomato. In any case, he did not peak, shall we say, in the summer. He probably would have won in August, but he was no way winning by the end of the summer. Why? For the reasons that I've suggested, not because of the next point what Mr. Truman did. Truman simply used the 80th Congress totally skillfully and without very little, or I mean without very much justification. He called it and do nothing Congress, and it had been an active Congress. I suggested that it not only pushed through

Marshall Plan, Greek Turkish aid, the Vandenberg resolution, which was the basis for NATO, Taft Hartley, which whether you liked it or not was at least an act, the unification of the armed services, peacetime draft, in other words it had done quite a lot and Truman knew it. But he decided that Hoover, indeed, was an image that he could not use and he preferred to attack Congress. Well, Dewey never engaged him on this issue, never faulted him on the argument. And Mr. Truman traveled, depends on which source you read either, 22,000 miles or 31,000 miles by train, making little speeches, giving Congress hell, and speaking probably to about six million Americans. Dewey also was putting out a good deal of effort, but it wasn't getting the kind of headlines that Truman began to get. The Democratic National Committee, almost in desperation, put out a comic book life of Harry Truman, which three million copies were distributed. This is not a first, but it's at least unusual. The other aspects of the

campaign I think have been adequately dealt with, but let me simply say that at the end, there was not only a Roosevelt coalition, but it was a period of relative prosperity. And if anyone had bothered to listen, the party in power usually wins when times are good, according to a rule that isn't a firm one, but it's a pretty good rule to remember. Truman indicated that the Democratic Party then was fighting an uphill battle when actually it was in a very good position. It's true he didn't have many funds in 1948, but he deliberately left his speeches, go long enough so that he'd be chopped off in the middle to suggest that the Democratic Party couldn't afford all the airtime that he needed. There was that degree of skill in his presentation, and he did in Oklahoma City, for example, he actually ran out of money and they had to get a kitty to get the train moving again. So it was it was a shoestring campaign, but the odds favored the Democrats. They did not favor the Republicans, and that in

the end is the real lesson of 1948. I want to greet my old colleague, Professor Niall Norton, our lady of the lake, who has been with us and the other experiments in this kind of teaching. I have somewhat of an ancillary subject, but I will be making reference back to material that was covered by both doctors, Rastal, to be able to tie this in as closely as I can. I have an axe to grind also, and the axis is substantially of this nature. I'd like to talk about an organizational form or mental viewpoint for understanding foreign policy, and this is appropriate at this particular time. It seems to me because 1948 is not a critical year necessarily, but it is a matter of transition in the area of foreign policy for the United States, and it seems to

me that it is much much an oversimplification to use such terminology as policy of containment, policy of detente, so on and so forth. In fact, it's not only an oversimplification is downright misleading. It requires more analysis in that to be understandable. Now what I propose to do is not entirely my own invention by any stretch of the imagination. Certainly two individuals Thomas Bailey and William Langer have hinted or used this. Bailey has used it particularly in the coverage of early United States diplomacy, and it consists basically of this. Bailey takes note that you can categorize in the matter of an organizational scheme and trying to understand foreign policy. You can categorize that there are policies, and if there are policies and a need for policies, then there are objectives to begin, so you have policies,

objectives, and then you have particular unique characteristics of diplomacy for the United States. Now in the matter of policies and in early US diplomacy, he rattles off such as these, the free seas, and if you can mentally construct this as a list, a policy, and you're going to make a list under it. Free seas, territorial expansion, Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism, open door, peaceful settlements of dispute, isolationism, and you use these categorical headings, and then every diplomatic event that occurs all up through the turn of the century, you list it under one of these policies, and you now have identified that there are separate and distinct policies that were in existence. That's what I would like to do in the matter of the post-World War II world, and Bailey, I guess, cops out in one respect that he doesn't follow through with

this all the way, and I haven't seen really other folks that do do this, but regardless, this is the approach. By the way, it's necessary to know that if you have policies, their objectives, therefore objectives, or let me name a few, for instance, and there is nothing unique to the United States about this, but certainly heading the list for every nation is the matter of security, but other objectives have been and could be trade, justice, peace, neutrality, freedom, humanitarianism, not that all objectives apply to every policy, perhaps we even misfire in an objective and an event under a particular policy, and to finish this out, I guess it's the Bailey approach, then there were unique characteristics for U.S. foreign policy in early history. The fact that there was geographical separation, the fact that there was any, there was

present and any reality, hyphenated Americans, the commercial orientation of the United States, so on and so forth. Now, every diplomatic event then, with that sort of a broad frame of reference, every diplomatic event should be able, you should be able to list it under one of these policies, and that just seems to me a good deal more analytical than just talking about policies of containment and policies of daytime. I would like to pick up and refer to an instance or so to set the stage that Dr. Rustell mentioned a moment ago, 1947, 1948, in this particular period of time, one that he didn't mention, was it in 1947, the United States reevaluated its course of action, orientation towards the Far East, we had been working with SCAP or General MacArthur, and we had also there was in existence what was known as the Far Eastern Commission, which

operated out of the old Japanese embassy in Worschickman, D.C., but at this particular time in 1947, the decided course of action to resurrect economically resurrect. The Japanese was coming into fruition, and certainly found itself in the matter of decisions and courses of action, a lot of part of 47 in the early part of 48. Also in 47, the common form, as it has been mentioned, was instituted. I started to say, resurrected, it used to be the common term previously, did it not. This is the world communist movement and its new version or form, and certainly all through 48, all through, there are several Soviet statements that are a matter of documentary record in support of this, and picking up, again, this particular interest. It's been mentioned the February 1948 Czech coup d'etat, the one that wasn't mentioned, May of 48, the five Western

European nations got together in the Brussels Pact, which is a mutual defense pact, which somewhat grows up later to become a NATO organization, and it's been referred to that there was the Berlin blockade and the successful airlift that accomplished this. Also in making the list of policies, I'd like to refer back to the campaign of 48 very briefly. The very first plank in the democratic party platform was foreign policy. Now I'm not trying to make too much of this necessarily, but in my itemization here in a moment, in that very first plank, or that very first utterances of the democratic platform relating to foreign policy, the very first article in that particular one referred to the UN and the support of the UN, and it made statements such as support of a

UN armed force, support of signing of treaties, so on and so forth, and about halfway through that foreign policy plank, it also talked about aid, and I'd like to visualize that as capital spelling, capital I, capital D, aid programs, and just following the aid pledge or plank or portion of the foreign policy plank, there was reference made to regional security arrangements. The interest at that particular time was more related to Western hemisphere, it will get an enlarged scope very very quickly. The Republicans certainly didn't neglect a foreign policy statement, and they also mentioned collective security, the UN aid programs, so there's very little difference, both of the parties said relatively the same thing, the democratic version was longer or more wordy

perhaps. I'm not sure and perhaps I'm asking a question, do you suppose there's any significance in the fact that the democratic platform put foreign policy first and the Republican platform put it last? I don't know, maybe I'm asking a rhetorical question. Certainly in the matter of the popular vote which has been noted for you here, a 2.2 roughly million plurality for Truman and basically that popular vote equally cast for Thurman and for Wallace and if you'd add all of that together as a vote relatively speaking against Dewey then perhaps there is some significance. I have somewhat of a small twinge in the matter of a visceral feeling that foreign policy did have some role to play in that particular election and the choice that the people played made at this time. There there was, categorizations are handy things aren't they? At least you could say

that there were three viewpoints, it seems to me that we're floating about in 1948. One certainly was isolationist in nature. Certainly one was rather hawkish though that term wasn't so much, wasn't so faddish in that particular day. I suppose in the matter of hawkishness I'm talking about rather extreme interventionist sympathizers and then very naturally the middle of the road which meant somewhat an alertness to events and a coping with the events as they arose. Now from that particular base I'm proposing to you that likewise post World War II that you can establish yourself a list of policies. My list goes like this you may devise your own. One list supported the United Nations. I get a lot of hoorah from students because of their feeling today relating to the UN but I can quote you President Ford September of this very last year and

making very very positive statements about support of the United Nations. So I propose that as a continuing policy that you're going to see. Aid programs, number three in your list of policies, Alliance systems, number four in your list of policies, Western military supremacy, number five one that I design and give title as feeling international political vacuums and hold somewhat hold overs from previous days and Bailey and pre World War II and Americanism free seas. Now just an example under each one of these for a moment and I'll have my axe ground I think sharp enough to defend myself. Under support for the UN very naturally the San Francisco conference. We propose you an atomic energy commission the UN action supported certainly by the United Nations or the

United States and leadership the Iran Greece, Incidents, Indonesia, Israel, Kashmir, North Korea. Even the two China concept relates and lists it seems to me under such a policy categorization. Under the aid programs well during the war itself, when are you or the United Nations relief and rehabilitation. Certainly they wouldn't have asked to could come under aid program categorization. The European Recovery Program, the ERP, the point for program, the agency for international development, the Peace Corps, even the World Bank and I get some argument from some folk that that really isn't an aid program but I propose to you that even if it's a loan program at that low-industryate then it does have inclinations towards being an aid program. Under Alliance systems I'll probably worry you with some of this the act of Chipotle Peck, NATO, Sito,

Anzu's, Santo and even under those such diplomatic events is the bilateral treaties, bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Nationalist China, Western military supremacy. Well I'm getting out a little away from specific events per se but certainly under Western military supremacy our status as a forces agreements, military appropriations, bills, massive retaliation. So that's the scheme likewise under the others the international political vacuums I guess the most recent issue is Diego Garcia and Mid-Indian Ocean. Now that's quite a rich array of subjects around which the question is. Okay my question is directed towards Mrs. DeVos. Hi Mrs. Rockhouse, it's going to be a round judge. Mrs. Rockhouse, come on,

my question is this, she was talking about the the inevitability of democratic victory in 1948 but I was noticing looking at the map of the election broken down by states that as far as I can see Truman is the first president that I know of to win election without carrying either the solid industrial states of the Northeast or the solid South. Isn't that an anomaly of Thorpe? Nothing's inevitable in politics. All I was suggesting was that the strength that Truman had was the strength of the Roosevelt Coalition which was strong enough so that even if important elements splintered off as they did in 48 the southern states that went to Thurmond the loss of New York which Wallace and other forces took away from him. He still had just enough to make it. Now notice this is not a tremendous victory. Truman comes in with roughly 49.5% of the popular vote.

Dewey comes with something like 45% of the rest are displayed across so he is not winning a landslide. He is not getting a mandate and it was simply that he knew just enough apparently about the politics particularly of the middle west, a whole crucial states there but it could have gone the other way and of course as you know early in the evening of election night it was predicted that Dewey indeed would win particularly after Dewey took New York then it was declared a feta complete that the Republicans could win. So it was not inevitable no but the strength that Truman had was the strength of a party structure which remained. You've been listening to an analysis of American politics and diplomacy part of a series covering United States foreign and domestic affairs from 1895 to the present. This series is drawn from a course taught at the University of Texas at Austin in spring 1975 by Walt and

Elspeth Rastau. Elspeth Rastau is associate professor of history and Dean of general and comparative studies. Her husband Walt Rastau is professor of economics and of history and was a top adviser to president's Kennedy and Johnson. The course was taught on an audiovisual interconnect among several Texas institutions of higher education. The interconnect originated at UT Austin's communication center under the auspices of KLRN public television and the Texas educational media project. What you have just heard was a transcription produced for radio listening by UT Austin's public radio station KUT FM. Thanks for listening this is the Longhorn radio network. Thank you.